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Abstract
This article investigates contests when heterogeneous players compete to obtain a rent
share. We prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium when players have
general preferences. Our results show that the conventional wisdom in contests—such as
a monotonically increasing relationship between effort and the size of the rent—may no
longer hold. We derive the key conditions on preferences under which this is the case. By
providing a much broader contest environment, our approach is able to nest conventional
contest analysis as well as providing a rich framework that helps to explain many previously
puzzling applications.
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1 Introduction
Sayre’s law: “In any dispute, the intensity of feeling is inversely proportional to the value
of the stakes at issue. That is why academic politics are so bitter.” (Coleman, 2008)
Contests characterize situations in which individuals seek to appropriate an economic rent.
This describes a wealth of economic scenarios—such as rent seeking, litigation, and conflict—
where the study of contests has improved our understanding of many fundamental economic
interactions. The conventional wisdom borne from the analysis of contests suggests that rent-
seeking effort is increasing in the size of the rent. Although this is consistent with many
applications, there are, however, many other environments in which we might observe that the
reverse is true; Sayre’s law—quoted at the beginning of this introduction—being a case in point.
In this article we study contests in which contestants compete for a share of a perfectly
divisible rent and their preferences are more general than have been studied in the existing
literature; namely, we allow for (i) diminishing marginal utility of the contest outcome and (ii)
interactions between the evaluation of the contest outcome (rent share) and the effort expended
in the contest. By providing a more general framework, we demonstrate that the conventional
wisdom—of a monotonically increasing relationship between the size of the rent and contes-
tants’ effort—need no longer hold.
Contests in the spirit of Tullock (1980) can be interpreted in two ways: ‘winner-take-all’
contests; and ‘share’ contests. In the ‘winner-take-all’ interpretation there exists a probability
that a player receives the entire rent based on his relative effort. In a ‘share’ contest, in contrast,
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each individual receives a (deterministic) share of the rent based on their effort relative to that
of their rivals. If each contestant has linear preferences over the allocation they receive from
the contest, then the two interpretations are strategically equivalent, since every contestants’
expected payoff in a winner-take-all contest is equivalent to their payoff in a rent-sharing con-
test. This equivalence, however, breaks down in all but the simplest of settings; thus, the two
types of contest command separate study.
Although major advances have been made in developing the analysis of winner-take-all
contests to capture non-linear evaluation of contest outcomes (see, for example, Konrad, 2009;
Congleton and Hillman, 2015), the same is not true of share contests: the two are not equivalent
under these extensions, and the study of share contests themselves has been neglected in the
literature. This lack of inquiry is concerning as many of the common applications of contests
are best viewed as individuals sharing a divisible rent. It is common, for example, to observe
effort being used to obtain a share of pollution permits, research funds, and parental attention,
to name but a few. Moreover, the interactions between sellers and buyers in markets can often
be considered as sharing contests (e.g., in bilateral oligopoly (Dickson and Hartley, 2008)).
Inspired by their broad applicability, the aim of this article is to advance the study of share
contests to account for more general preferences.
The conventional wisdom for share contests developed thus far has identified a monotoni-
cally increasing relationship between contestants’ effort and the size of the rent: as the stakes
increase, individuals invest more in effort (this is also true for winner-take-all contests). Al-
though prima facie, this might appear correct, consideration of many applications suggest that
the opposite, in fact, may be true: when contested rents are relatively small there may exist
intense competition. The quote concerning Sayre’s law at the beginning of this article provides
a leading example. Likewise, parents would not find it strange that their children are more
effortful in seeking the attention of the parent that is in the home for a smaller proportion of
the day. Further, similar interactions are observed within competition for natural resources (i.e.,
conflict over land use, water rights, and minerals): as Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008, 2009) in-
vestigate, when the abundance of natural resources increases within a country, there is evidence
to suggest that there is less rent seeking (conflict) and increased economic growth. These em-
pirical findings contrast with conventional contest frameworks, which would predict the very
opposite. Although there may exist numerous ways to rationalize such behavior by appealing
to considerations outside of the contest environment, there is a very intuitive rationalization
within the contest itself: if agents have diminishing marginal utility over their allocation within
a contest then when the allocation is small (large) the incremental benefit from improving that
allocation is large (small) which may command more (less) effort.
In this article we consider a conventional contest framework where players exert effort in
contesting a perfectly divisible economic rent in which the contest success function—influenced
by all contestants’ efforts—determines each contestant’s share of this rent. We focus initially on
simple Tullock contests, and follow the approach of Cornes and Hartley (2003, 2005, 2012) by
recognizing and exploiting the aggregative properties of the game that is played. This allows
us to consider both the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium with heterogeneous
contestants under some rather general restrictions on contestants’ preferences. We then study
the comparative static properties of equilibrium in a tractable way, particularly considering
the effect of a change in the size of the contested rent. Having defined a contestant’s utility
function over their contest allocation and effort, we then go on to define the marginal rate of
substitution, which gives the additional rent required to compensate for an increase in effort.
How fast or slow this marginal rate of substitution changes relative to the contest allocation is a
key determinant of a contestant’s effort response to an increase in the rent: effort will increase or
decrease depending on whether it falls short of, or exceeds, a threshold. In the standard model
it will never exceed this threshold, but this can easily be the case with more general—and
very reasonable—preferences. From a simple Tullock share contest with general preferences,
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we then advance our framework by including a more general contest success function as well
as providing an analysis where the rent is endogenously determined by aggregate efforts.
Throughout all advancements, we observe the rate of change of the marginal rate of substitution
as pivotal to the outcome of the contest.
An important factor of our framework is the inclusion of diminishing marginal utility of the
contest allocation, as well as allowing for interactions between contest effort and the (marginal)
valuation of the rent allocation. Since the contribution of Hillman and Katz (1984), non-linear
preferences have been considered in winner-take-all contests—in which the contest success
function determines the probability of winning the indivisible rent—by accounting for contes-
tants’ expected utility of engaging in the contest. This extension has commanded substantial
attention in the literature (Long and Vousden, 1987; Skaperdas and Gan, 1995; Konrad and
Schlesinger, 1997; Treich, 2010; Cornes and Hartley, 2012; Jindapon and Whaley, 2015; Jindapon
and Yang, 2016).1 For a larger rent being contested in a winner-take-all contest, the inclusion of
expected utility generates nothing surprising. This formulation, however, does not carry over
to the rent-sharing interpretation of contests, where the evaluation of the outcome of the con-
test should be the share of the rent received with certainty. We thus provide the first analysis
of share contests where individuals have heterogenous and general preferences.
This analysis extends the domain of applicability of this important class of models to situa-
tions where contestants have more than a simple linear evaluation of the contest outcome. Our
framework is not without consequence for, while we show that as in standard contests reason-
able conditions admit a unique equilibrium, a conventional wisdom of the contest literature—
that effort is increasing in the size of the rent—does not hold when preferences satisfy some
very standard conditions. Understanding this is of key importance: the conventional wisdom
from the study of contests should not be applied to economic environments where individuals’
preferences do not satisfy the strict assumptions of the existing literature. Our article shows
that this would be misguided and the interactions within contest environments are often a lot
richer.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides two illustrative
examples to highlight the importance of non-linear preferences in contests, and explores the
intuition that underpins these examples. In Section 3 we outline sharing contests in which
players have general preferences, and we go on to analyze the existence and uniqueness of
Nash equilibrium by exploiting the aggregative properties of the game in Section 4. In Section
5 we explore the relationship between the size of the contested rent and contestants’ effort
in equilibrium. Section 6 considers the effect on the dissipation ratio of accounting for more
general preferences. In Section 7 we provide two extensions: to more general contest success
functions; and to situations in which the rent is endogenously determined by aggregate effort.
Section 8 provides our concluding remarks. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
2 Tullock contests, examples, and intuition
In a contest each of the n contestants can be thought of as choosing a level of (costly) effort
xi ≥ 0 in contesting a rent of size R. Their success in the contest is determined by the contest
success function φ(xi, x−i), which is influenced not only by their own effort but also the effort
of other contestants, denoted by the vector x−i. In a simple Tullock contest this takes the form
φ(xi, x−i) = xi/[xi + X−i] if the aggregate effort X ≡ xi + X−i is strictly positive, otherwise
φ(xi, x−i) = 1/n, where X−i is the sum of all contestants’ efforts excluding that of contestant
i. Two interpretations of such contests are possible. In the first, the rent is indivisible and the
1Long and Vousden (1987) consider a model in which individuals each contest a rent that they will ultimately
receive a share of, but the share is determined randomly, the process being influenced by all contestants’ choices of
efforts. However, this is not a contest as axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996) since there is nothing to tie the shares of
contestants together that would ensure the full rent, and only the full rent, is allocated.
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contest success function determines the probability that each contestant is awarded the rent;
thus, in such winner-take-all contests only one contestant becomes the winner of the economic
rent. In the second interpretation, which is the focus of this article, the rent is perfectly divisible
and the contest success function determines the share of the rent awarded to each contestant.
In a winner-take-all contest the allocation a typical contestant receives is determined prob-
abilistically. Two states occur: that in which the contestant wins the contest, which occurs with
probability φ(xi, x−i) with an outcome R− xi; and that in which the contestant does not win
the contest with outcome −xi, which occurs with probability 1− φ(xi, x−i). In the sharing inter-
pretation the allocation of the rent to a contestant is deterministic: the contest success function
determines the share of the rent the contestant receives with certainty. If contestants’ evalua-
tion of the contest outcome is linear then, even with a non-linear but additive cost of effort,
the expected payoff in the winner-take-all interpretation is exactly the same as in the sharing
interpretation, so they are strategically equivalent and conclusions drawn for one apply to the
other. However, from very early in the contest literature non-linearities in the evaluation of
the contest outcome in the winner-take-all interpretation—in the form of risk aversion—have
been considered (Hillman and Katz, 1984). The expected utility in a winner-take-all contest
bears no resemblance to a sensible payoff function in a sharing contest where the outcome is
deterministic, and therefore none of the advances that account for non-linear evaluation of the
contest outcome can be applied to sharing contests: the two require separate study. Despite
the wealth of applications where sharing contests are a more appropriate model for determin-
ing the allocation of economic rents that we alluded to in the introduction, there has been no
attempt to capture more general preferences in such contests.
In a sharing contest the allocation of the rent a contestant receives is zi = φ(xi, x−i)R. The
best the literature has done in providing an analysis of sharing contests is to consider non-linear
cost of effort in which case payoffs take the form Vi(xi, X−i) = zi − ci(xi); it is from careful
study of this model (that could also be deduced from a winner-take-all interpretation since
the two are equivalent in this case) that provides the conventional wisdom of a monotonically
increasing relationship between the contested rent and contest effort. However, this misses two
key aspects of the evaluation of the contest outcome: first, contestants may exhibit diminishing
marginal utility over the contest outcome; second, there may be interactions between the effort
a contestant exerts in contesting the rent and their (marginal) evaluation of the allocation from
the contest, in which case payoffs should not be separable in xi and zi. It is not inconceivable
that both of these are important.
We now turn to present two examples that illustrate the importance of diminishing marginal
utility. In the first, we consider a contest in which there are n identical contestants whose
payoffs take the form Vi(xi, X−i) = [zi − k]α − xi, where we assume 0 < α ≤ 1, k ≥ 0, and
R > nk. Clearly, if α = 1 this is a standard contest with a fixed cost k of competing in the
contest. We deduce from investigation of the first-order condition that the equilibrium effort in
any symmetric Nash equilibrium, written as a function of the contested rent R, takes the form
x∗(R) =
α[n− 1]
n2
R
[
R
n
− k
]α−1
.
Consequently, the response of individual effort to a change in the rent is given by
x∗′(R) R 0⇔ R R nk
α
.
When α = 1, x∗′(R) > 0 for all R > nk. However, when α < 1, x∗′(R) < 0 for nk < R < nkα ,
and x∗′(R) > 0 for R > nkα ; by extension the same conclusions apply to aggregate effort. As
such, although the conventional wisdom holds when the rent is large enough, when it is small
a reduction in the size of the contested rent will lead to an increase in contest effort. This is
illustrated in Panel (a) of Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Panel (a) shows equilibrium effort in the first example, with α′ < 1; Panel (b) shows equilib-
rium effort in the second example, with γ′ > 0.
Our second example again considers a situation where there are n identical contestants, but
where their payoffs take the form Vi(xi, X−i) = zi − γ2 [zi]2 − xi. To ensure positive marginal
utility at least in equilibrium, we assume R < n/γ. If γ = 0 payoffs are linear in contest
allocation and effort, as in a standard contest. Analysis of the symmetric Nash equilibrium in
this contest reveals
x∗(R) =
n− 1
n3
R[n− γR]
and therefore for γ > 0 the response of equilibrium effort to a change in the contested rent is
given by
x∗′(R) R 0⇔ R Q n
2γ
.
If γ = 0 then x∗′(R) = n−1n2 > 0 for all R, but when γ > 0 then x
∗′(R) > 0 for 0 < R < n/2γ,
but x∗′(R) < 0 for n/2γ < R < n/γ. In this example the conventional wisdom holds when
the rent is small, but when the rent is large further increases in the size of the rent lead to a
reduction in contest effort. Panel (b) in Figure 1 illustrates this case.
In each of these examples—which involve quite standard preferences—contestants exhibit
diminishing marginal utility over the contest allocation. In the first example contestants would
increase their effort if the rent is small and reduced further. With a small allocation from the
contest, marginal utility is high and any reduction in that allocation resulting from a reduction
in the contested rent would have a large effect on utility, commanding an increase in effort
despite it being costly. In the second example, contestants would reduce their effort if the rent
is large and it increased further. With a large allocation from the contest, marginal utility is
low and an increase in the contest allocation resulting in an increase in the rent would lead
contestants to save the cost of effort for a reduction in their contest allocation, leading to a
reduction in effort. These arguments, based on standard microeconomic principles, make clear
that the conventional wisdom is at stake when diminishing marginal utility is accounted for in
sharing contests.
To further explore the intuition behind this finding, consider that a contestant derives utility
from the contest allocation zi and their effort xi, given by ui(zi, xi). Then in a Nash equilibrium
in a simple Tullock contest each contestant may be seen as solving the problem
max
xi≥0
ui(zi, xi) s.t. zi =
xi
xi + X−i
R.
This optimization problem can be represented graphically in the (xi, zi)-space by considering
the point on the budget constraint—which is an increasing and concave function that starts
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Figure 2: Rent expansion paths aa′ with different preferences. In Panel (a) the slope of indifference
curves do not depend on zi, so the rent expansion path is upward-sloping; in Panel (b) the contestant
has diminishing marginal utility but the marginal rate of substitution does not increase by as much as
the slope of the budget constraint, so the rent expansion path is again positively-sloped; in Panel (c)
the marginal rate of substitution increases by more than the slope of the budget constraint, giving a
negatively-sloped rent expansion path.
from the origin—that puts the individual on the most north-westerly indifference curve derived
from the utility function. Thus, we seek a level of effort—denoted by x˜i—where the marginal
rate of substitution of contest allocation for effort is equal to the slope of the budget constraint,
which is X
−i
[xi+X−i ]2 R. With a linear payoff function u
i(zi, xi) = zi − xi and the marginal rate of
substitution is everywhere equal to 1; and with linear evaluation of the rent but a convex cost
of effort, i.e., ui(zi, xi) = zi− ci(xi), it is 1/ci ′(xi). In each of these cases the slope of indifference
curves do not depend on the contest allocation: indifference curves are vertical displacements
of each other.
Define a rent expansion path as the points that trace out the optimal effort-contest allocation
combination for a contestant when the rent increases (keeping fixed the actions of all other
contestants). This is illustrated in Figure 2 by aa′ when the rent increases from R to R′ for
a variety of preferences. From Figure 2, we can observe that with a higher rent the slope
of the budget constraint increases everywhere. With linear preferences (illustrated in Panel
(a)) indifference curves are straight parallel lines and so in this case the former optimal effort
can no longer be optimal on the new budget constraint since at this allocation the slope of
the indifference curve must be less than the slope of the budget constraint. This necessitates
an increase in effort to regain tangency, hence tracing out a positively-sloped rent expansion
path. The same is true with quasi-linear preferences in which the cost of effort is convex and
there is linear evaluation of the contest allocation. In this case (not illustrated) the slope of the
indifference curve does not depend on zi: at the former optimal level of xi on the new budget
constraint the slope of the indifference curve must be less than that of the budget constraint,
again necessitating an increase in optimal effort.
With more general preferences the marginal rate of substitution2 is − uixuiz and if the marginal
utility of the contest allocation is decreasing with zi, then when zi increases with xi fixed,
the marginal rate of substitution increases. If, as in Panel (b) of Figure 2, the marginal rate of
substitution increases by less than the increase in the slope of the budget constraint then, again,
the rent expansion path will be positively-sloped, consistent with the conventional wisdom on
contests. Conversely, if the marginal rate of substitution increases by more than the increase
in the slope of the budget constraint, then with the higher rent optimality will occur at a lower
2Throughout we use subscripts to denote partial derivatives.
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level of effort, giving a negatively-sloped rent expansion path, as shown in Panel (c) of Figure
2.
This discussion highlights that taking diminishing marginal utility into account in contests
is very important, since it reverses some of the core results of contest theory. Another key
factor—not explored within these examples—is the general conditions on preferences that al-
low for either a positively or negatively sloped rent expansion path in equilibrium. Therefore,
a key aim of this article—and what we now turn to—is to understand under what conditions
on preferences the conventional wisdom in contests holds, and when it does not.
3 Sharing contests with general preferences
In this section we formally define our model. Consider a set of individual contestants N =
{1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2, which participate in a contest to obtain an economic rent R. Their success in
the contest is determined by their effort relative to the effort of other contestants and is given
by the contest success function φ(xi, x−i), where xi denotes the costly effort of player i ∈ N and
x−i denotes the vector of all other contestants’ effort levels. In this article we focus on contests
in which the rent is perfectly divisible and is shared between contestants in accordance with
the contest success function, rather than awarded to a single contestant as would be the case
in a winner-take-all contest. Define zi as being contestant i’s allocation of the rent from the
contest:
zi ≡ φ(xi, x−i)R. (1)
We begin by studying a ‘simple’ Tullock contest for an exogenously-given rent of size R in
which
φ(xi, x−i) =
{
xi
xi+X−i if X > 0 or
1
n otherwise,
(2)
where, as previously stated, X ≡ ∑j∈N xj is the aggregate effort of all contestants and X−i ≡
X − xi. Later in the article we consider more general contest success functions, as well as
situations in which the size of the rent is endogenously determined by contestants’ efforts.
For each contestant i we define a utility function ui(zi, xi) over their contest allocation, zi,
and their effort in contesting the rent, xi. We denote by MRSi(zi, xi) contestant i’s marginal
rate of substitution between zi and xi:
MRSi(zi, xi) ≡ −u
i
x
uiz
,
which gives the amount of additional rent that is required to compensate for an incremental
increase in effort. Consider the (xi, zi)-space. Since utility is increasing in z but decreasing in
effort, indifference curves derived from the utility function defined above will have a positive
slope (measured by the marginal rate of substitution just defined) and utility is increasing in a
north-west direction.
We allow contestants to be heterogeneous with different utility functions, but assume that
all contestants’ utility is increasing in their allocation of the rent at a decreasing rate; decreasing
in effort at an increasing rate; and if there are complementarities between the allocation of the
rent from the contest and effort then these are sufficiently small.
Assumption 1. For each i ∈ N,
(a) the utility function is twice continuously differentiable with uiz > 0, uizz ≤ 0, uix < 0, uixx ≤ 0;
(b) MRSi(0, 0) < ∞, and if MRSi(0, 0) = 0 then MRSix(0, 0) > 0;
(c) uizx ≤ min
{
MRSi
∣∣uizz∣∣ , 1MRSi ∣∣uixx∣∣} .
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Concavity of the utility function is, of course, standard. The first part of condition (b) rules
out contestants always being inactive and the second part rules out contestants always wanting
to exert infinite effort. The last condition in the assumption—which ensures complementarities
between zi and xi are sufficiently small—implies that MRSiz ≥ 0 and MRSix ≥ 0; to observe this
note that
MRSiz = −
uizuizx − uixuizz
(uiz)2
and MRSix = −
uizuixx − uixuizx
(uiz)2
and therefore MRSiz ≥ 0 ⇔ uizx ≤ −MRSiuizz and (noting that uix < 0) MRSix ≥ 0 ⇔ uizx ≤
− 1MRSi uixx.
Assumption 1, which we suppose is satisfied in the remainder of the analysis, allows for
a very broad class of preferences. For instance, this framework nests the standard linear case
where ui(zi, xi) = zi − xi, which is the dominant structure used within the contest literature;
and we can also capture a convex cost of effort if we specified ui(zi, xi) = zi − ci(xi) with
cix > 0, cixx ≥ 0. As well as being able to capture diminishing marginal utility, the fact that we
do not assume a separable utility function also allows us to capture situations in which there
are interactions between the level of effort a contestant uses, and their (marginal) valuation of
the contest allocation. Existing studies have assumed that preferences are (quasi-)linear, with
utility being linear in the share of the rent received. Thus, by considering general preferences,
our framework can not only provide an analysis that nests previous studies of share contests but
also provides a tractable methodology by which to consider alternative and novel preferences,
which can be used to advance and expand the understanding and applicability of contests.
4 Characterizing equilibria in Tullock contests with general prefer-
ences
We now turn to characterize equilibria in a simple Tullock contest over an exogenously-given
perfectly divisible rent R. We seek a Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous-move game of
complete information in which the player set is the contestants N = {1, . . . , n}; their strategies
are their choice of effort xi ≥ 0; and their payoffs are given by their utility of the contest outcome
ui(zi, xi) that we assume satisfies Assumption 1, where zi = φ(xi, x−i)R with φ(xi, x−i) specified
in (2).
First, we note that at a Nash equilibrium of the contest each player may be seen as solving
the problem
max
xi≥0
ui
(
xi
xi + X−i
R, xi
)
.
The necessary first-order condition for xi to maximize utility given X−i = ∑j 6=i∈N xj, i.e. identify
a best response, is
X−i
[xi + X−i]2
Ruiz + u
i
x ≤ 0, (3)
with equality if xi > 0.
Lemma 1. The first-order condition is both necessary and sufficient for identifying a best response.
Contestant i’s best response is thus given by bi(X−i; R) = max{0, xi} where xi is the unique
solution to
MRSi
(
xi
xi + X−i
R, xi
)
=
X−i
[xi + X−i]2
R,
and we seek a Nash equilibrium in which players use mutually consistent best responses.
Rather than working directly with best responses, we turn to analyze the contest using an
extension of the ‘share function’ approach that exploits the aggregative nature of the game,
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as developed by Cornes and Hartley (2003, 2005, 2012), but where we allow for more general
preferences in sharing contests. This approach differs from pursuing study of best responses
in the following way: rather than asking what value of a contestant’s effort is consistent with
a Nash equilibrium in which the aggregate effort of all other contestants is X−i (which is the
best response), it asks what value of individual effort is consistent with a Nash equilibrium in
which the aggregate effort of all contestants, including contestant i, is X. This gives individual
consistency, and to identify a Nash equilibrium aggregate consistency is required, where the
sum of individual efforts is exactly equal to the aggregate effort. Rather than working with
effort levels, it is natural in sharing contests to work with shares of the aggregate effort, in which
case the aggregate consistency condition requires the sum of the shares to be equal to 1.
For each contestant we define a ‘share function’ that gives their share of the rent that is
consistent with a Nash equilibrium in which the aggregate effort of all contestants is X > 0. By
replacing X−i with X − xi in the first-order condition (3), letting σi ≡ xi/X and then replacing
xi with σiX, we deduce that contestant i’s share function is given by si(X; R) = max{0, σi}
where σi is the solution to
li(σi, X; R) ≡ MRSi(σiR, σiX)− [1− σi]R
X
= 0. (4)
Share functions shed light on individual behavior consistent with a Nash equilibrium: Xsi(X; R)
is the effort of contestant i consistent with a Nash equilibrium in which the aggregate effort
of all contestants is X > 0. As noted, identification of a Nash equilibrium requires aggregate
consistency, that is, the sum of individual share functions to be equal to unity. Letting
S(X; R) ≡ ∑
j∈N
sj(X; R),
we have the following equivalence statement.
Lemma 2. In a contest with rent R, there is a Nash equilibrium with aggregate effort X∗ > 0 if and
only if
S(X∗; R) = 1.
Questions of the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium now rest on consideration
of the behavior of the aggregate share function S(X; R), whose properties are derived from
individual share functions, and its intersection with the unit line. The following lemma sets
out the properties of individual share functions.
Lemma 3. For each contestant i ∈ N,
1. si(X; R) is a continuous function defined for all X > 0 and R;
2. (a) si(X; R) → 1 as X → 0; and (b) either si(X; R) = 0 for all X ≥ X¯i(R) ≡ R/MRSi(0, 0) if
MRSi(0, 0) > 0 or, if MRSi(0, 0) = 0, si(X; R)→ 0 as X → ∞; and
3. si(X; R) is strictly decreasing in X for 0 < X < X¯i(R).
Note that if MRSi(0, 0) > 0 there is some ‘drop-out’ value of aggregate effort X¯i(R) where
the contestant would become inactive in the contest; whereas if MRSi(0, 0) = 0 for all i ∈ N
then all contestants will be active in any contest.
The properties of individual share functions imply that in a contest in which the rent is R
the aggregate share function S(X; R), being constructed from a sum of at least two individual
share functions, exceeds 1 when X is small enough, is less than one when X is large enough,
and is continuous and strictly decreasing in X implying there is exactly one value of X where
S(X; R) = 1.
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Proposition 1. In a contest with rent R there is a unique Nash equilibrium with aggregate effort X∗
such that
S(X∗; R) = 1
in which the equilibrium effort of contestant i is xi∗ = X∗si(X∗; R).
As such, we confirm that in rent-sharing contests where players can have more general
preferences over their allocation of the rent and the effort exerted in contesting the rent (but
that satisfy Assumption 1), the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium—as found in simple Tullock
contests with linear separable preferences—is preserved.
5 The effect of changing the size of the contested rent
We now turn to investigate how contestants’ equilibrium behavior depends on the size of the
rent they are contesting. We write X (R) for the equilibrium aggregate effort in a contest where
the size of the rent is R, which is implicitly defined by
S(X (R); R) = 1. (5)
Having exploited the aggregative properties of the game, this becomes a relatively straightfor-
ward task, since understanding the effect of an increase in the rent on equilibrium aggregate
effort boils down to understanding how share functions vary with R, which we consider in the
following lemma.
Lemma 4.
siR R 0⇔ zi MRSiz −MRSi Q 0.
As we demonstrate in the following proposition, this allows us to understand the effect on
the equilibrium aggregate effort expended in contesting a larger rent, one of the main objectives
of our study.
Proposition 2. If zi MRSiz −MRSi Q 0 for all i ∈ N then in a contest with R′ > R, X (R′) R X (R).
Although it is tempting to implicitly differentiate (5) to understand the effect of a change in
the contested rent on equilibrium effort, it is not correct to do so in general because if there are
contestants for whom MRSi(0, 0) > 0 then there will be values of X where these contestants
‘drop out’ of the contest and the aggregate share function is not differentiable at these drop-
out values. This necessitates us to assume that the sign of zi MRSiz − MRSi is the same for
all contestants. If, however, we are willing to assume MRSi(0, 0) = 0 for all contestants then
they will always be active in any contest, implying implicit differentiation of (5) can be used.
Proposition 2 can then be re-stated without assuming the sign of zi MRSiz −MRSi is the same
for all contestants.
Proposition 3. Suppose that MRSi(0, 0) = 0 for all i ∈ N. Then
X ′(R) R 0⇔ ∑
j∈N
wj[zj MRSjz −MRSj] Q 0,
where wi = [R[R MRSiz + X MRSix +
R
X ]]
−1 > 0.
With a larger contested rent, whether effort increases, as the conventional wisdom suggests,
or decreases depends on the sign of zi MRSiz −MRSi. If this is positive then the conventional
wisdom need not hold, as demonstrated in the previous propositions. Since zi MRSiz−MRSi =
[zi]2 ∂
∂zi
{
MRSi
zi
}
, this condition can be interpreted as requiring that contestants’ marginal utility
increases sufficiently as zi increases, indeed at a rate that is larger than the increase in zi. In
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conventional analysis of contests this does not happen since the marginal rate of substitution
is assumed to be constant in zi, but as demonstrated through study of our examples, it can
happen with very reasonable preferences.
Returning to our diagrammatic exposition in Section 2, this condition makes perfect sense:
when the rent increases the change in the slope of the budget constraint is given by [1 −
σi][1/X] which, using the first-order condition, is equal to MRSi/R; the change in the slope
of indifference curves is ∂∂R{MRSi(σiR, σiX)} = σi MRSiz; as such, at the original optimal effort
on the new budget constraint, the slope of the indifference curve increases by more (less) than
the slope of the budget constraint—giving rise to a reduction (increase) in effort—precisely if
zi MRSiz −MRSi > (<)0.
In terms of derivatives of the utility function,
zi MRSiz −MRSi =
zi[uixuizz − uizuixz] + uizuix
[uiz]2
.
In the standard case studied in the literature the term in square brackets in the numerator is
equal to zero so, noting that uix < 0, zi MRSiz −MRSi is always negative. The above expression
reveals that a negative relationship between the size of the contested rent and contest effort can
stem from either sufficiently strong diminishing marginal utility of the contest allocation (i.e.
uizz sufficiently negative); or a sufficiently negative interaction between effort and the marginal
utility of the contest outcome (i.e. uizx sufficiently negative); or indeed a combination of both.
6 The dissipation ratio
The early contest literature (e.g., Tullock, 1980) had a keen interest in studying the dissipation
ratio, which is the ratio of aggregate effort to the contested rent. Understanding the properties
of this reveals whether the social cost of rent seeking can be approximated by knowing the size
of the contested rent, even if rent-seeking efforts are not themselves observable. In a simple
Tullock contest with linear evaluation of the contest outcome and linear costs, it is well-known
(see, for example, Konrad, 2009) that the dissipation ratio is invariant to the size of the contested
rent.
We now consider how the dissipation ratio responds to a change in the contested rent in
a Tullock contest with general preferences. Recall that the share function satisfies the first-
order condition (4). Let D = XR be the dissipation ratio. Then, we can write share functions
as being dependent on the dissipation ratio by changing variables since X = DR. As such,
σi = si(DR; R) will satisfy
li(σi, DR; R) ≡ MRSi(σiR, σiDR)− [1− σi] 1
D
= 0, (6)
and the equilibrium dissipation ratio, written D(R), will satisfy
S(D(R)R; R) ≡ ∑
j∈N
sj(D(R)R; R) = 1. (7)
When preferences are such that aggregate effort decreases in the rent then, of course, the
dissipation ratio also reduces. In the following proposition we demonstrate that this is true
whenever preferences satisfy the conditions stated in Assumption 1 that we have been working
under thus far: although aggregate effort may increase in the size of the contested rent, it never
increases faster than the increase in the rent.
Proposition 4. If R′ > R, then D(R′) ≤ D(R).
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We have so far limited our attention to cases where contestants’ marginal utility of the
contest outcome is declining. If we allow for marginal utility to be increasing, then it is not
inconceivable that in a contest with a higher rent the increase in effort by contestants with
such preferences may be greater than the increase in the rent, which will mean the dissipation
ratio increases. To explore this we need to be careful that when we allow convexity in the
utility function we maintain concavity of the optimization problem contestants face. For the
purpose of illustration we assume that all contestants are homogeneous and focus on symmetric
equilibria in which each contestant’s equilibrium share of the rent is 1/n. When all contestants
are symmetric we can use implicit differentiation of (7) to understand how the dissipation ratio
changes with the contested rent. This is given by
D′(R) = −
dsi
dR
dsi
dD
.
Now, when contestants are symmetric zi = R/n and xi = X/n, so
liσ = n
[
R
n
MRSiz +
X
n
MRSix +
1
nD
]
,
dli
dD
=
R
n
MRSix +
n− 1
nD2
, and
dli
dR
=
1
R
[
R
n
MRSiz +
X
n
MRSix
]
.
To ensure concavity of the optimization problem (liσ > 0) we must assume that MRSiz >
−XR MRSix − 1X (noting that D = X/R). It is also the case that dl
i
dD > 0, which implies
dsi
dD <
0, and therefore the sign of D′(R) will be the same as the sign of dsidR . This is positive if
R
n MRS
i
z +
X
n MRS
i
x < 0, which requires MRSiz < −XR MRSix. Therefore, when preferences are
such that −XR MRSix − 1X < MRSiz < −XR MRSix, which is a non-empty range, the dissipation
ratio will be increasing in the size of the contested rent.
7 Extensions
In this section we pursue two generalizations of our model of contests with general preferences:
the first allows for a more general contest success function; the second allows for the rent to be
endogenously determined by contestants’ efforts.
7.1 General contest success functions
So far, we have considered a simple Tullock contest in which the contest success function has
taken the form φ(xi, x−i) = xixi+X−i . Of course, Tullock contests can be more general than
this with a contest success function given by φ(xi, x−i) = [x
i ]r
[xi ]r+∑j 6=i∈N [xj]r
, where r captures a
contest technology. To study more general contest success functions we follow Szidarovszky
and Okuguchi (1997) and specify that
φ(xi, x−i) =
pi(xi)
∑j∈N pj(xj)
, (8)
where we assume that pi(0) = 0, pi ′ > 0 and pi ′′ ≤ 0.3
We now need to re-consider our analysis with this more general contest success function.
So that the share function approach can be utilized, let us change the variable of consideration
3Cornes and Hartley (2005) studied contests with general technologies but assumed linear payoffs for contestants.
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and rather than focus on effort, xi, think of contestants choosing their ‘input’ yi = pi(xi), from
which effort can be derived since xi = pi
−1
(yi). The assumptions on the contest technology just
stated imply pi
−1 ′ > 0 and pi−1 ′′ ≥ 0. With this change of variable, contestants can be seen as
choosing their input to maximize their payoff ui(zi, pi
−1
(yi)), where their share of the rent is
zi = y
i
yi+Y−i R in which Y
−i = Y− yi and Y is the aggregate input ∑j∈N yj.
The first-order condition of this optimization problem that characterizes a contestant’s input
best response is
Y−i
[yi +Y−i]2
Ruiz + p
i−1 ′uix ≤ 0
with equality if yi > 0.4 Replacing Y−i with Y − yi and letting σˆi = yi/Y, this can be used to
define a contestant’s share function as sˆi(Y; R) = max{0, σˆi}, where σˆi is the solution to
lˆi(σˆi, Y; R) ≡ MRSi(σˆiR, pi−1(σˆiY))pi−1 ′(σˆiY)− [1− σˆi]R
Y
= 0. (9)
As with our previous analysis, we can use share functions to shed light on the properties of
Nash equilibrium in the contest, since there is a Nash equilibrium with aggregate input Y∗ if
and only if ∑j∈N sˆj(Y∗; R) = 1, in which contestant i’s input is yi∗ = Y∗ sˆi(Y∗; R) and therefore
their contest effort is xi∗ = pi−1(Y∗ sˆi(Y∗; R)).
In this more general framework an analog of Lemma 3 applies to individual share functions
by treating X as Y; letting Y¯i(R) = R/[MRSi(0, 0)pi
−1 ′(0)]; and noting that share functions are
monotonically decreasing in Y since
sˆiY = −
lˆiY
lˆiσˆ
= − σˆ
i[pi
−1 ′]2MRSix + σˆi MRSi pi
−1 ′′ + [1− σˆi] RY2
pi−1 ′[RMRSiz +Ypi
−1 ′MRSix] +YMRSi pi
−1 ′′ + RY
< 0.
The aggregate equilibrium input as a function of the contested rent is denoted Y(R), which
will satisfy
∑
j∈N
sˆj(Y(R); R) = 1.
To consider how the aggregate input varies with the size of the contested rent let us assume,
for convenience, that all contestants are active in equilibrium, which will be true if either
MRSi(0, 0) = 0 for all contestants; or at least each contestant’s drop-out value exceeds the
equilibrium aggregate input. This allows us to simplify the analysis by using implicit differen-
tiation. Since
Y ′(R) = −∑j∈N sˆ
j
R
∑j∈N sˆ
j
Y
,
and as we just showed sˆiY < 0 for all i ∈ N, the important property is how share functions
vary with the contested rent, sˆiR. Implicit differentiation of the first-order condition (9) gives
sˆiR = −lˆiR/lˆiσˆ, and since lˆiσˆ > 0 it follows that
sˆiR R 0⇔ σˆi MRSiz pi
−1 ′ − [1− σˆi] 1
Y
Q 0
⇔ p
i−1 ′
R
[zi MRSiz −MRSi] Q 0,
4Under our restrictions on the contest technology it is straightforward to show, given Lemma 1, that the second-
order condition is satisfied.
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where the last line follows from utilizing the first-order condition. As such, the conclusions
we made in the simple contest for aggregate effort in Proposition 3 equally apply to aggregate
input in more general contests; that is, if zi MRSi −MRSi Q 0 for all i ∈ N then Y ′(R) R 0.
However, these conclusions apply to the aggregate contest input, not to effort. To con-
clude that aggregate contest effort exhibits the same properties, we must consider the ef-
fect on individual contest input for each contestant, since this will then imply the change
in their individual effort, from which conclusions about aggregate effort can be drawn. Writing
yˆi(Y(R); R) = Y(R)sˆi(Y(R); R), it follows that
dyˆi(Y(R); R)
dR
= sˆiY ′ + Y(sˆiYY ′ + sˆiR)
= Y ′(sˆi + Y sˆiY) + Y sˆiR.
Now,
σˆi +YsˆiY = σˆ
i − Y[σˆ
i[pi
−1 ′]2MRSix + σˆi MRSi pi
−1 ′′ + [1− σˆi] RY2 ]
pi−1 ′[RMRSiz +Ypi
−1 ′MRSix] +YMRSi pi
−1 ′′ + RY
=
σˆi pi
−1
RMRSiz +
R
Y
pi−1 ′[RMRSiz +Ypi
−1 ′MRSix] +YMRSi pi
−1 ′′ + RY
> 0
by gathering terms over a common denominator and simplifying. As such, since the signs of
sˆiR and Y ′ are the same, it follows that
dyˆi(Y(R); R)
dR
R 0⇔ zi MRSiz −MRSi Q 0,
and therefore the same is true of individual, and by extension aggregate, effort.
7.2 Endogenous rent
We next turn to consider the case of endogenous determination of the rent, first studied by
Chung (1996), where we revert to a simple Tullock contest. Suppose that the rent being con-
tested is influenced by the aggregate effort of contestants according to some technology f (X; α),
that depends in a positive way on a parameter α that will allow us to consider the effect of an
improvement in the rent generation technology. If fX < 0 then rent-seeking activity deterio-
rates the size of the rent, while if fX > 0 it enhances it: with this specification sharing contests
embody a wide variety of applications including, for instance, Cournot competition (in which
the rent is total revenue).
We make the following assumption concerning the rent generation technology.
Assumption 2. f (X; α) is bounded and twice continuously differentiable with fα > 0 and fXX ≤ 0.
Further, we assume that limX→∞ fX ≤ 0 and if fX < 0 then fX > fXX−MRS
i
x
MRSiz
for all i ∈ N.
With this specification, zi = x
i
xi+X−i f (x
i + X−i; α), and the first-order condition that charac-
terizes a contestant’s best response is given by
uiz
[
X−i
[xi + X−i]2
f (xi + X−i; α) +
xi
xi + X−i
fX(xi + X−i; α)
]
+ uix ≤ 0
with equality if xi > 0. The second-order condition, after some manipulation, requires that
2MRSiuizx + MRS
i
[
MRSiuizz +
1
MRSi
uixx
]
− uiz
[
2[X− xi]
X2
[
f
X
− fX
]
− x
i
X
fXX
]
< 0.
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Noting that concavity of the rent generation function implies f /X − fX ≥ 0 and fXX ≤ 0
allows the steps of Lemma 1 to be followed to conclude that the second-order condition is
indeed satisfied.
We now need to ensure that share functions satisfy an analog of Lemma 3. With endogenous
determination of the rent a contestant’s share function will be given by s˜i(X; α) = max{0, σi}
where σi satisfies
l˜i(σi, X; α) ≡ MRSi(σi f (X; α), σiX)− (1− σi) f (X; α)
X
− σi fX(X; α) = 0. (10)
First, note that
l˜iσ = f MRS
i
z + XMRS
i
x +
f
X
− fX > 0
since f /X− fX ≥ 0 by virtue of our assumption that f is concave. As such, share functions are
single valued. Next, note that a contestant’s drop-out value, denoted ˜¯Xi(α), is now implicitly
defined, if it exists, as the value of X where l˜i(0, X; α) ≡ MRSi(0, 0)− f (X; α)/X = 0, which
is unique since again concavity of f implies f /X is decreasing in X. If such a ˜¯Xi(α) exists
then s˜i(X; α) = 0 for all X ≥ ˜¯Xi(α). Otherwise s˜i(X; α) is defined for all X > 0, and we must
ensure it vanishes in the large X limit. Since limX→∞ fX ≤ 0 by Assumption 2, for the first-
order condition to be satisfied as X → ∞ the conditions in Assumption 1 imply that we require
σi = 0, confirming limX→∞ s˜i(X; α) = 0. Finally, we deduce that
s˜iX = −
l˜iX
l˜iσ
= −
σi[ fX MRSiz + MRSiX − fXX] + 1X [1− σi]
[
f
X − fX
]
f MRSiz + XMRSix +
f
X − fX
< 0
since in Assumption 2 we specify that if fX < 0 then fX >
fXX−MRSix
MRSiz
.
In a contest with rent technology f (X; α), the equilibrium aggregate effort will be X˜ (α),
such that
∑
j∈N
s˜j(X˜ (α); α) = 1.
Since the sum of share functions is strictly decreasing in X by our previous deductions, how the
equilibrium aggregate effort responds to a shift in the rent generation technology will depend
on how individual share functions respond to a change in α. Implicit differentiation of (10)
gives
s˜iα = −
l˜iα
l˜iσ
,
and having already established that l˜iσ > 0 we know that sgn{s˜iα} = − sgn{l˜iα}. Now,
l˜iα = σ
i fαMRSiz − [1− σi]
fα
X
− σi fXα
=
1
f
[
fαzi MRSiz − fα
[
[1− σi] f
X
+ σi fX
]
+ σi fX fα − σi f fXα
]
=
1
f
[
fα[zi MRSiz −MRSi] + σi[ fX fα − f fXα]
]
.
Analogous to our previous analysis, if s˜iα R 0 for all i ∈ N then for α′ > α we will have that
X˜ (α′) R X˜ (α). As such, we can conclude that for α′ > α,
fα[zi MRSiz −MRSi] + σi[ fX fα − f fXα] Q 0 for all i ∈ N ⇒ X˜ (α′) R X˜ (α).
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With endogenous determination of the rent the condition that governs the direction of change
in equilibrium aggregate effort in the contest when the rent generation technology improves
is, as would be expected, more complicated than in our previous analysis. Our condition
on the change in the ratio of the marginal rate of substitution to zi as zi changes features in
this condition, but the properties of the rent generation technology are also important. Note,
however, that if f (X; α) = αg(X) then fX fα− f fXα = 0, and so how equilibrium aggregate effort
changes when α changes is governed by exactly the same conditions as in the simple contest
with exogenous rent that is the benchmark model of this article.
8 Conclusions
In microeconomic analysis, constant marginal utility and separable preferences are generally
seen as a very special case. Yet, the study of sharing contests in the existing literature has
assumed this as standard. In this article, we have extended the theory of contests to allow for
general preferences that include diminishing marginal utility and interactions between contest
effort and the evaluation of the allocation from the contest. With more general preferences the
conventional wisdom of a monotonically increasing relationship between the contested rent
and effort expended in the contest—which proxies the social cost of rent-seeking—need no
longer hold.
We take an aggregative games approach to study sharing contests with heterogeneous con-
testants that have general preferences. This allows us to deduce the uniqueness of Nash equi-
librium in this more general framework and to undertake a tractable analysis of the properties
of equilibrium. We show that the direction of change in the ratio of the marginal rate of sub-
stitution to contest allocation is crucial in determining whether aggregate effort increases or
decreases when the contested rent increases. If contestants have either sufficiently strong di-
minishing marginal utility, or there are sufficiently strong interactions between effort and the
(marginal) valuation of the contest allocation—or a combination of both—the conventional wis-
dom does not hold and aggregate effort decreases when the contested rent increases. We also
study cases with more general contest technologies, and where the contested rent is endoge-
nously determined by contestants’ effort.
Our framework opens up the applicability of contests to economic environments where the
basic economic interaction corresponds to a sharing contest, but individuals’ preferences are
more sophisticated than the simple form that has so far been investigated within the contest
literature. Imposing linear utility functions is highly restrictive and inconsistent with most
real-world situations. It is important to recognize that the conventional analysis that assumes
linear utility functions is highly restrictive and inconsistent with most real-world situations.
Thus it would be misleading to draw conclusions about the relationship between the strategic
variable (effort) and the contested economic rent based on the existing results in the contest
literature. Our analysis offers a framework within which to understand the precise nature of
this relationship.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The second-order sufficient condition is
uizx2
X−i
[xi + X−i]2
R + uizz
[
X−i
[xi + X−i]2
R
]2
+ uixx − uiz2
X−i
[xi + X−i]3
R < 0.
For any xi > 0, the first-order condition implies X
−i
[xi+X−i ]2 R = −
uix
uiz
= MRSi. As such, the second
derivative can be re-written
2MRSiuizx + MRS
i
[
MRSiuizz +
1
MRSi
uixx
]
− 2
xi + X−i
MRSiuiz
<2MRSiuizx −MRSi
[
MRSi|uizz|+
1
MRSi
|uixx|
]
<2MRSiuizx − 2MRSi min
{
MRSi
∣∣∣uizz∣∣∣ , 1MRSi ∣∣∣uixx∣∣∣
}
=2MRSi
[
uizx −min
{
MRSi
∣∣∣uizz∣∣∣ , 1MRSi ∣∣∣uixx∣∣∣
}]
≤0,
since uizx ≤ min
{
MRSi
∣∣uizz∣∣ , 1MRSi ∣∣uixx∣∣} under Assumption 1.
Proof of Lemma 2. We seek to show that X∗ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if S(X∗; R) = 1.
First, the ‘if’ part. If X∗ is a Nash equilibrium then xi∗ = bi(X−i∗; R) for all i ∈ N. This implies
xi∗ = bi(X∗ − xi∗; R) which in turn implies xi∗ = X∗si(X∗; R) for all i ∈ N, and therefore that
X∗ = X∗ ∑j∈N sj(X∗; R), and consequently S(X∗; R) = 1. For the ‘only if’ part, note that for
each i ∈ N, X∗si(X∗; R) = bi(X∗ − X∗si(X∗; R); R). If S(X∗; R) = 1 then X∗ = X∗S(X∗; R) and
so for each i ∈ N, X∗si(X∗; R) = bi(X∗S(X∗; R)− X∗si(X∗; R); R) = bi(X−i∗; R), thus allowing
us to conclude that xi∗ = X∗si(X∗; R) for all i ∈ N constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 3. We address each property in turn.
1. Recall from (4) that a contestant’s share function is implicitly defined as the value of σi
where
li(σi, X; R) ≡ MRSi(σiR, σiX)− [1− σi]R
X
= 0,
if σi is positive, otherwise the share function takes the value zero. Note that
liσ = R MRS
i
z + X MRS
i
x +
R
X
> 0 (11)
since Assumption 1 implies MRSiz ≥ 0 and MRSix ≥ 0, as we noted shortly after stating
the assumption. This allows us to conclude that there is at most one value of σi > 0 where
li(σi, X; R) = 0, so si(X; R) is a function. Continuity of the share function is established
from the assumed differentiability of the utility function.
2. For part (a), as X → 0, Xli(σi, X; R) ≡ XMRSi(σiR, σiX) − [1− σi]R → −[1− σi]R, so
σi = 1 is the only possibility to achieve li(σi, X; R) = 0, implying limX→0 si(X; R) = 1.
To prove part (b), note that when σi = 0, li(0, X; R) = MRSi(0, 0)− R/X. The fact just
deduced that liσ > 0 implies that if li(0, X; R) ≥ 0 then li(σi, X; R) > 0 for all σi > 0,
and therefore si(X; R) = 0. If MRSi(0, 0) > 0, X¯i(R) ≡ R/MRSi(0, 0) is well-defined
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and we can conclude that si(X; R) = 0 for all X ≥ X¯i(R). If MRSi(0, 0) = 0 then as
X → ∞, [1− σi][R/X]→ 0 and so for the first-order condition (4) to be satisfied we need
MRSi(σiR, σiX) = 0. If σiX > 0 then part (b) of Assumption 1 implies MRSi(σiR, σiX) >
0 and therefore by necessity we must have limX→∞ σiX = 0, which requires σi = 0. As
such, limX→∞ si(X; R) = 0.
3. Finally, to understand how share functions vary with X we apply implicit differentiation
to (4) to deduce that
siX = −
liX
liσ
= − σ
i MRSix + [1− σi] RX2
R MRSiz + X MRSix +
R
X
< 0, (12)
confirming the strict monotonicity claimed.
Proof of Proposition 1. From Lemma 2 we know that Nash equilibria are identified by intersec-
tions of S(X; R) with the unit line. From Lemma 3 we also know that individual share func-
tions are single-valued, continuous and strictly decreasing in X > 0, and have the property
si(X; R) → 1 as X → 0 and either si(X; R) = 0 for all X ≥ R/MRSi(0, 0) or, if MRSi(0, 0) = 0,
si(X; R) → 0 as X → ∞. As such, there exist two values of X, X and X¯ > X, such that
S(X; R) > 1 and S(X¯; R) < 1. Combined with the fact that S(X; R) is continuous and strictly
decreasing in X > 0, this implies there is a single value of X where S(X; R) = 1, and so a single
Nash equilibrium exists.
Proof of Lemma 4. Recall from (4) that a contestant’s share function is implicitly defined as the
value of σi where
li(σi, X; R) ≡ MRSi(σiR, σiX)− [1− σi]R
X
= 0.
As such,
siR = −
liR
liσ
= − σ
i MRSiz − [1− σi] 1X
R MRSiz + X MRSix +
R
X
.
The denominator (as deduced in (11)) is positive. Noting that σiR = zi and that [1− σi] RX =
MRSi from the first-order condition, gives
siR = −wi[zi MRSiz −MRSi],
where wi = [R[R MRSiz +X MRSix +
R
X ]]
−1 > 0, from where the statement in the lemma follows.
Proof of Proposition 2. Lemma 4 demonstrated that if zi MRSiz − MRSi Q 0 for all i ∈ N then
each individual’s share function has the property that siR R 0. This implies that S(X (R); R′) R
S(X (R); R) = 1, where the final equality holds by definition of equilibrium in Lemma 2. The
fact that individual share functions, and therefore the aggregate share function, are strictly
decreasing in X then implies that the value of X where S(X; R′) equals 1, which is precisely
X (R′), must satisfy X R X (R), which concludes the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 3. Implicit differentiation of (5) gives
X ′(R) = −∑j∈N s
j
R
∑j∈N s
j
X
We deduced in Lemma 3 that siX < 0 for all i ∈ N, and therefore sgn{X ′(R)} = sgn{∑j∈N sjR}.
From Lemma 4 we know that siR = −wi[zi MRSiz − MRSi], from where the statement in the
proposition follows.
Proof of Proposition 4. We first show how share functions defined in (6) vary in D and R. Implicit
differentiation of (6) reveals
dsi
dD
= −
dli
dD
liσ
= − σ
iRMRSix + [1− σi] 1D2
RMRSiz + DRMRSix +
1
D
< 0
and
dsi
dR
= −
dli
dR
liσ
= − σ
iDMRSix
RMRSiz + DRMRSix +
1
D
≤ 0
Now the second of the deductions just made implies that for R′ > R we have S(D(R)R′; R′) ≤
S(D(R)R; R) = 1. The first of the above deductions implies that S(DR; R) is strictly decreasing
in D which implies that the value of D that makes S(DR′; R′) equal to 1, which is precisely
D(R′), must not exceed D(R).
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